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Abstract
This Introduction to Rosenberg’s essay starts with a brief synopsis of his life, then summarises the 
key arguments of the essay itself before looking briefly at the twin issues of the social base of the 
fascist parties (wider than just the ‘petty bourgeoisie’) and the passive complicity/compliance of 
‘ordinary Germans’, as the literature now terms whole sectors of the civilian population that were 
defĳined by their apathy or moral indiffference to the horrors of the Nazi state.
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Arthur Rosenberg was a major historian and Communist Reichstag deputy 
best known for his books The Birth of the German Republic, 1871–1918 (1928) and 
A History of Bolshevism (1932). The three broad phases of his life as a Marxist 
are the years from 1919 to April 1927, when he played an active part in the KPD-
Left, the period from May 1927 to March 1933, following his resignation from 
the KPD (the years that best defĳine him as a ‘Communist without a party’), and 
the tragic fĳinal decade of his life when he fled Germany along with his family, 
would fĳind himself stripped of German citizenship, and lead an impoverished 
life as a tutor in Brooklyn College, New York, having failed to fĳind any sort of 
academic position in England. All of Rosenberg’s major works stem from the 
last period of his life, except for The Birth of the German Republic, which he 
published in 1928.
As a member of the left wing of the USPD, Rosenberg found himself joining 
the German Communist Party in October 1920. The hallmark of the Left-current 
within the KPD was of course its intransigent opposition to any sort of front 
with the SPD in the intensely volatile political climate of Weimar, but unlike 
Fischer and Maslow (more substantial leaders of the ‘Berlin Left’, as the 
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KPD-Left was called), Rosenberg himself was deeply resentful of excessive 
Comintern interference in the afffairs of the German party. By 1925 the KPD-
Left was split wide open, lost control of the party-leadership to Thälmann, and 
saw a major purge of the Left-elements, including Korsch and Werner Scholem, 
all denounced as ‘anti-Bolshevik’. Rosenberg seems to have survived this purge 
but resigned from the party in April 1927. He remained a Reichstag deputy for 
about a year, but was doubly ostracised both within the academic establishment 
and by the orthodox Left in Germany. Thanks to the implacable hostility of 
Eduard Meyer and Ulrich Wilcken, he was denied a proper appointment in 
Berlin University. By now, the eve of the massive expansion of Nazism among 
the electorate, he wrote exclusively for publications run by the SPD. In A 
History of Bolshevism, the last book he published before his exile, he 
characterised Stalin’s Russia as ‘state-capitalist’ (this in 1932). On 30 January 
1933, Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor and the German Communists 
frantically appealed to the SPD for a ‘united front’ when the terror started in 
February. By the end of March Rosenberg had fled to Zurich with his family, in 
September he moved to London where he failed to land a job at the LSE, and 
then four months later got a one-year fellowship at the University of Liverpool 
where he wrote Democracy and Socialism. Fascism as a Mass-Movement 
appeared as a booklet (‘Broschüre’) in 1934 under the pseudonym ‘Historikus’ 
and published by the Karlsbad publisher Graphia, which was run by SPD 
refugees and German-speaking Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia. Rosenberg 
left for the States in late October 1937 and eventually died of cancer in 1943.1
The abbreviated version of Rosenberg’s fascism-essay that runs to 65-odd 
pages in Abendroth’s collection Faschismus und Kapitalismus is the one 
translated here.2 It divides into three portions, the fĳirst mapping a general 
vision of the history and politics of Europe in the later-nineteenth century, and 
the second and third dealing with Italy and Germany respectively. The 
distinctive feature of the argument is summed up in the title itself, namely, the 
conception of fascism as a mass-movement. Written in 1933, this contrasted 
both with the Comintern’s offfĳicial line that fascism was ‘the power of fĳinance-
capital itself ’,3 a sort of political incarnation of capital, and with the contrary 
theories that saw fascism mediating between capital and labour on the model 
1. Biographical data from Riberi 2001 and Keßler 2003, both of which (Keßler especially) have 
full bibliographies of Rosenberg’s writings. Eduard Meyer was Germany’s leading ancient 
historian at the time but also a staunch nationalist (a supporter of the Deutsche Vaterlandspartei) 
and a resolute opponent of Weimar, e.g., Keßler 2003, pp. 48–9.
2. Rosenberg 1967.
3. Dimitrofff told the Seventh Congress of the Comintern: ‘Der Faschismus – das ist die Macht 
des Finanzkapitals selbst’.
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implied in Marx’s analysis of Bonapartism.4 Rosenberg seems to have steered 
clear of this whole debate, which as a historian he may well have found 
superfĳicial. The crucial point for him was to know where fascism came from, not 
what it resembled in the past. He rejected the view that fascism was somehow 
primordially or quintessentially connected with the petty bourgeoisie in 
particular – either driven by it or largely founded on it – suggesting that it had 
a much wider social appeal and was more widely based than that view implied. 
If fascism was a product of its own ideology, then that ideology was already 
widespread by 1914. Throughout the main countries of Europe, liberalism was 
either stillborn or successfully contained and defeated. This was as true of the 
Hapsburgs as it was of Germany or Britain for that matter. The crux of the new 
‘authoritarian conservatism’, as he called it, was its ability to win mass-support, 
popular conservative majorities, by encouraging a new breed of nationalism 
that was ultra-patriotic, racist and violently opposed to the Left. This took 
diffferent forms in diffferent parts of Europe but its essential features were the 
same – a ‘demagogic nationalism’ that targeted minorities (in Europe, mainly 
Jews) to build a mass-support. The powerful surge of antisemitism that swept 
through Europe in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was a fundamental 
part of this radical nationalism.
Thus Rosenberg’s key argument here is that ‘the ideology which is today 
called “fascist” was already fairly widespread throughout Europe before the War, 
and exerted a strong influence on the masses.’ He goes on to say, ‘However, 
with one exception, what was missing then was the peculiar tactic of using 
stormtroopers which is thoroughly characteristic of modern fascism. The sole 
exception was formed by the Black Hundreds of Tsarist Russia and their ability 
to stage pogroms’ (p. 152). 
Legally, the stormtroopers should be tried and sentenced to jail. But in fact nothing 
of the sort happens to them. Their conviction in the courts is pure show – either 
they do not serve their sentence, or they are soon pardoned. (p. 153.)
The important insight here is that stormtroopers work with the connivance of the 
state, a theme he returns to repeatedly. As for the pogrom itself, he claims ‘the 
rage of the patriotic masses has to be manufactured’ (ibid.). This is what 
happened in the Tsarist pogroms of 1905.
Rosenberg saw Italian fascism as a modernising force that broke the power 
of the Southern cliques to pave the way for Northern industrial capitalism. In 
Italy, ‘Fascism was and remained the party of the advanced North’ (p. 169), 
smashing the working class but also ‘br[eaking] the dominance of the backward 
4. Notably Thalheimer 1967 (from Gegen den Strom. Organ der KPD (Opposition), 1930). 
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feudal cliques of Central and Southern Italy’ (ibid.). ‘Mussolini was the leader 
of the modern Italian North, with its bourgeoisie and its intelligentsia.’ (ibid.)
The state-capitalist concentration of the country in the so-called ‘corporatist 
system’ facilitated control of the country by the most efffĳicient groups of capitalists. 
Heavy industry, chemicals, automobiles, aircraft, and shipping were all 
systematically developed. Where in all this is the ‘petty-bourgeois’ spirit that is 
supposed to form the essence of fascism? (p. 170.)
In the German case, it is the sheer weight of the nationalist Right that is so 
striking. Nazism emerged from this background, survived its fragmentation in 
the years of stability between 1924 and 1929, and retotalised both its ideologies 
as well as much of the German past – the massive weight of militarism and the 
widespread latent antisemitism that survived into the Weimar period. 
Rosenberg starts the German analysis by drawing a key distinction between 
households dependent on wage-employment [die Arbeitnehmerschaft] and 
industrial workers in the narrower sense. For example, he included government-
employees and offfĳice-workers in the proletarian camp because their jobs 
involved some form of paid employment. Of a total of around 25 million paid 
employees and proletarians in this broad sense, ‘at most only 11 million were 
factory-workers in the true sense’ (p. 172). Those workers, say, roughly a third 
of Germany’s population, remained loyal to the Left down to the bitter end,5 
but other sections of the general mass of paid employees (the majority) 
consistently voted for the bourgeois parties throughout the Weimar years. The 
huge Republican majority of January 1919 soon crumbled. The November 
Revolution left the state-machinery intact – that is, in the hands of the old 
bureaucracy, a bastion of reaction – and the middle-class, ‘large sections of the 
white-collar and government-employees who had greeted the Republic in 
November with enthusiasm’, ‘would soon stand aloof from it in sheer 
disappointment’ (p. 173). In fact, the percentage of the wage-earning population 
that was opposed to the Left (including the Catholic Centre Party) increased 
dramatically in the crucial early years of Weimar. Rosenberg claims that by 
March 1933, when the Nazis polled a stunning 17 million votes against 12 million 
for the Social Democrats and KPD, something like 11½ million votes of the 
‘other wage-earners’-category went to the parties of the Right.
Fascism as a Mass Movement is an essay about the origins and growth of 
fascism, not fascism in power. Though much of the humongous bibliography 
that has grown up around the subject particularly since the late sixties deals 
5. The KPD was a solidly working-class party, cf. Kater 1983, p. 37: ‘[in 1927] more than 80 
percent of the KPD members belonged to the working class’. 
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overwhelmingly with the latter (with Neumann’s Behemoth as an early and 
outstanding example of the kind of issues that would dominate subsequent 
historiography), the essential themes of Rosenberg’s argument stand fully 
vindicated by recent scholarship. ‘The error of the Italian Communist Party lies 
mainly in the fact that it sees fascism only as a military-terrorist movement, not 
as a mass movement with deep social roots’, Clara Zetkin warned in 1923.6 It is 
this conception – of the capacity of the Right to mobilise mass-support – that 
forms the central thread of Rosenberg’s essay, where the key to its interpretation 
lies both in the political defeat of liberalism and its rapid retreat across most of 
Europe in the nineteenth century and in the virulent nationalisms that emerged 
to buttress the rule of traditional élites against the threat of democracy and 
Marxist socialism. If the singular brutality of the Nazi genocide remains a 
watershed in the history of the modern world,7 one that Rosenberg could 
scarcely have anticipated in 1933, the racial myth of the Volksgemeinschaft that 
paved the way for it was far from novel, its roots fĳirmly embedded in the 
‘integral nationalism’ of Treitschke and Maurras and the visions of national 
redemption preached by Schönerer and Lueger (against both Slavs and Jews) 
to pan-German constituencies in Austria that Weiss has described as ‘one of 
the most anti-Semitic publics west of Russia’.8 Thus the argument, cited above, 
that ‘the ideology which is today called “fascist” was already fairly widespread 
throughout Europe before the War’ is thoroughly convincing. It is a major 
insight into why the fascist movements could expand so rapidly, both in Italy 
and in Germany (in the early and late twenties respectively), against the 
background of war-hysteria and assaults on the Left (in Italy) and of a powerful 
nationalist Right in Germany that prepared the ground for the Nazis. The 
centrality of racism to Nazism in particular emerges more forcefully in 
Rosenberg’s essay than any other Marxist writing of the twenties and early 
thirties. So does the argument that the success of the fascists depended crucially 
on the connivance or active complicity of the existing state-authorities, many 
of whom would of course have been active members of the PNF and NSDAP. 
This was starkly obvious in Italy where the squadristi ‘succeeded because they 
could always count on the state’, (p. 164) but no less so in Germany where, as 
Neumann noted, not one of the conspirators in the right-wing Kapp Putsch of 
1920 had been punished even 15 months later, ‘the Weimar criminal courts 
were part and parcel of the anti-democratic camp’, and the ‘courts invariably 
6. Zetkin cited in Poulantzas 1974, p. 84. She refers to ‘broad social layers, large masses that 
reach even into the proletariat’, cf. Riddell 2011. 
7. Traverso 1999.
8. Weiss 1977, p. 119, with Chapter 6 on Heinrich von Treitschke, and Chapter 8 on Maurras. 
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became sounding-boards for [Nazi] propaganda’;9 and where, as Rosenberg 
points out, ‘a whole series of government-offfĳicials, especially in the army, . . . 
maintained close contact with the Freikorps and [other] counter-revolutionaries’ 
(p. 176). Finally, a major part of the essay sets out to discredit the so-called 
‘middle-class theory’ of fascism. Rosenberg was convinced that fascism was not 
a petty-bourgeois movement nor was the mass-base of the fascist parties 
confĳined to the petty bourgeoisie. Of course, Trotsky saw fascism ‘raising itself 
to power on the backs of the petty bourgeoisie’, and then putting the middle-
classes ‘at the service of capital’. ‘Through the fascist agency, capitalism sets in 
motion the masses of the crazed petty bourgeoisie.’10 Reich, too, made the 
middle-class central to fascism, seeing submission to or ‘identifĳication with’ 
‘authority, fĳirm, state, nation, etc.’ as peculiar to the mass-psychology of the 
lower-middle-class. ‘The middle class was and continued to be the mainstay of 
the swastika.’11 But of course none of these characterisations prove that fascism 
was a movement of the middle-classes, at least in the stronger sense in which 
Luigi Salvatorelli had argued this for Italy in 1923.12
What is true, on the other hand, is that the middle-class was particularly 
susceptible to Nazi propaganda, and that, whereas ‘working-class milieus 
dominated by the parties of the Left . . . remained unyielding terrain for the 
NSDAP’, a major share of the Nazi vote in the electoral landslide of September 
1930, at least 40 per cent, came from the middle-classes.13 That a further 25 per 
cent of Nazi voters was drawn from the working class suggests fĳirst that the 
German workers were far from homogeneous either socially or politically, and 
second that the appeal of fascism was not class-specifĳic but rather, as Neumann 
suggested, more widely spread over ‘the most diverse social strata’.14 These are 
both points that come through with remarkable clarity in Fascism as a Mass-
Movement. Rosenberg’s distinction between the general mass of wage-earners/
salaried employees and industrial workers in particular crucially explains the 
diffference in political behaviour between workers who stayed with the Left 
down to the end and workers who supported the Nazis. Kershaw notes that, 
 9. Neumann 1942, pp. 27fff., and his striking observation that ‘[i]n the centre of the counter-
revolution stood the judiciary’. 
10. Trotsky 1971, pp. 405, 406, 155.
11. Reich 1972, pp. 40fff., and the statement ‘fascism, viewed with respect to its mass basis, was 
actually a middle-class movement’ (Reich 1972, p. 42).
12. Salvatorelli 1923.
13. Kershaw 2001, p. 334. 
14. Neumann 1942, p. 37: the NSDAP was ‘composed of the most diverse social strata but never 
hesitat[ed] to take in the dregs of every section, supported by the army, the judiciary, and parts of 
the civil service, fĳinanced by industry, utilizing the anti-capitalist sentiments of the masses and 
yet careful never to estrange the influential moneyed groups’. 
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down to the Reichstag election of May 1928, the Nazis’ ‘concentration on the 
industrial working class had not paid dividends’,15 yet Mühlberger, analysing 
branch-membership data for various periods between 1925 and 1933, claims 
that the Nazis secured ‘signifĳicant support’ in predominantly lower-class areas.16 
Anywhere between 28 per cent and 46 per cent of Nazi branch-members might 
consist of workers, both skilled and unskilled.17 The contradiction is only 
apparent. First, the ‘rush to the swastika’ occurred chiefly after 1928, following 
the winter of 1928–9 and against the background of worsening economic 
conditions. But, just as important, if workers living in heavily industrialised 
urban centres such as Hamburg remained immune to Nazism, those who lived 
in small communities and villages were more vulnerable. ‘It was residence in a 
rural environment that was decisive.’18 And not just residence, of course, 
but age, gender, religion, and whether one retained a job at all. Workers were 
on the whole signifĳicantly under-represented in the hard-core Nazi ranks, 
except for the SA where, at least in Western and Southern Germany, the rank-
and-fĳile was largely ‘lower class’19 (mainly unemployed, as Rosenberg notes), 
the white-collar groups, or ‘new middle-class’ more broadly, dramatically over-
represented, as were ‘the élite’, including students and academic professionals. 
Certainly the most balanced assessment of this still largely controversial issue 
remains the one Noakes offfered years ago in his study of Lower Saxony and 
electoral districts that saw some of the highest Nazi votes in 1930–3. He 
concluded that the Nazis ‘could appeal to a whole range of classes and interests’, 
even if ‘it was the lower middle class which was most attracted to the party’.20 
This, broadly, is Rosenberg’s position, since he makes repeated reference to the 
white-collar element and civil servants being a decisive part of the Nazi social 
base, while refusing to characterise either the party or the movement as 
middle-class. White-collar workers in particular showed a bizarre afffĳinity for 
the racist [völkisch] organisations that were striking precursors of the Nazi 
movement, above all the Deutscher Schutz- und Trutzbund (DSTB) and its 
successor the DVSTB.21 That the SPD white-collar union failed to organise 
more than a handful of these employees who preferred to join ‘professional’ 
15. Kershaw 2001, p. 303.
16. Mühlberger 1991, p. 203.
17. Mühlberger 1991, pp. 37, 77, 115, 139.
18. Kater 1983, p. 36.
19. Mühlberger 1991, p. 180. ‘Workers’ formed 58 per cent of all SA recruits prior to 1933 
(Mühlberger 1991, p. 177).
20. Noakes 1971, pp. 79, 19.
21. Noakes 1971, pp. 9–11; Merkl 1975, p. 56. Lohalm 1970 calls the Bund a ‘Wegbereiter des 
Nationalsozialismus’. 
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organisations22 suggests that, more than material interest or the immediate 
perception of one, these (white-collar elements, lower- and middle-ranking 
civil servants, the self-employed, etc.) were strata of the Mittelstand that drew 
their identity or their sense of one from their family-backgrounds and the 
deeply nationalist and authoritarian traditions interiorised there.23 Describing 
his own experience of visiting large factories and managements in 1934 and 
1935, Sohn-Rethel wrote:
As a rule the hard core of the workers, but to a lesser extent the younger ones and 
the new apprentices, were not Nazi and did not pretend to be Nazi . . . But the 
middle and lower white-collar workers [Angestellten] were those for whom the 
party-badge was a symbol of faith and who assumed unmistakeable Nazi 
bearings . . . The members of the ‘new intelligentsia’ were the most inflexible of 
these – the real rabid fanatics [who] seemed so passionately committed to the 
interests of capital without having any personal share in its profĳits.24
‘Symbol of faith’, ‘rabid fanatics’ – these are not characterisations that could 
apply to the mass of ‘ordinary Germans’, those who were neither direct 
perpetrators nor hate-campaigners. Yet this is where the real problem 
of fascism lies. As Christopher Browning notes in his extraordinary book 
Ordinary Men, ‘the vast majority of the general population did not clamor or 
press for anti-Semitic measures’, yet they allowed a gulf to open up between 
the Jewish minority (and of course other minorities) and themselves.25 Thus 
we have a paradox or seeming paradox of what Browning in another work 
calls a ‘widespread receptivity to mass murder’,26 or what, less dramatically, 
has been called ‘German public support for Nazi rule’,27 including the fact that 
knowledge of the concentration-camps (and deportations, mass-shootings of 
Jews, etc.) was available and ‘fairly widespread’,28 coupled, on the other hand, 
with the sharp and obvious distinction between the overtly Nazi element of 
the population and a civilian population, the so-called ‘Mitläufer’, that could 
show repeated disgust at overt acts of brutality and violence even as it accepted 
‘the broad principles of legal discrimination and exclusion on racial grounds’ 
and harboured discriminatory attitudes.29 Brecht’s own ambivalence about 
22. Lebovics 1969, p. 37.
23. Merkl 1975, based on the Abel biographies.
24. Sohn-Rethel 1975, pp. 195–6; Sohn-Rethel 1978, pp. 135–7, translation modifĳied.
25. Browning 2001, p. 200.
26. Browning 1992, p. 64.
27. Bull (ed.) 1986, p. 5. Of course, as Tim Mason never failed to point out, ‘[t]he Nazi regime 
set out to obliterate the German Left’, arresting anywhere between a hundred to two hundred-
thousand socialists and murdering ‘tens of thousands’ of them; Mason 1986, pp. 96–7. 
28. Kershaw 1986, pp. 378fff.
29. Kershaw 1986.
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the distinction between the German people and the National Socialists would 
of course survive to dominate postwar Germany and appear repeatedly in 
Fassbinder’s work and in fĳilms such as Germany, Pale Mother. As Anton Kaes 
says, ‘Those born in 1945, like Fassbinder, were given the German past as an 
unwanted legacy’.30 Fassbinder himself had an acute sense of the continuities 
between the bourgeois values of the nineteenth century and the ideology of the 
Third Reich, the ferocious culmination of German/bourgeois nationalism in 
the horrors of the Nazi state.31 This is a perspective close to Rosenberg’s view 
that it was the bourgeoisie that formed the chief bearer of this redemptive 
conception of German power in the decades before 1914 (pp. 188–9). But the 
problem of civilian compliance remains. ‘O Germany, pale mother! / What 
have your sons done to you . . .’ The Nazi movement was almost exclusively 
male,32 yet millions of women voted for the Nazis in 1932, and in 1936 ‘eleven 
million out of thirty-fĳive million women in Germany were members of the 
NS-Frauenschaft’.33 To suppose that women were ‘peculiarly resistant to 
National Socialism’34 is to espouse a strangely essentialist feminism that fails 
to confront the issue of fascism in any serious way, and just as David Bankier’s 
work broke new ground in exploring the issue of compliance head-on, showing 
the complex ways in which passive and genocidal forms of racism interacted,35 
Claudia Koonz’s books Mothers in the Fatherland and The Nazi Conscience 
are both important pointers to some of the ways in which socialists and the 
Marxist Left should restructure the terms of the debate about fascism, neither 
exaggerating the extent to which workers (for example) were integrated into 
the fascist state36 nor shying away from the harder issue of the type and degree 
of complicity of large masses of the population in the régime’s criminality, 
however we choose to characterise that – as ‘genocidal consensus’,37 ‘passive 
complicity’,38 or just plain ‘moral indiffference’.39
30. Kaes 1992, p. 76.
31. Fassbinder 1992, pp. 115fff. 
32. Mühlberger 1991, p. 90: ‘It was almost exclusively a male movement . . .’
33. Saldern 1996, pp. 219, 217.
34. Stephenson 1981, cited in Saldern 1996, p. 218.
35. Bankier 1992.
36. See, for example, the excellent paper by Tobias Abse (Abse 1996), which argues that ‘a 
tradition of class-conscious militancy established in Italy in particular pre-Fascist circumstances 
was not broken under Fascism’ (Abse 1996, p. 53) and that Italian Fascism ‘never really gained any 
widespread consensus of support amongst the industrial working class of northern and central 
Italy’ (Abse 1996, p. 42). 
37. Koonz 2003, p. 221.
38. Kulka and Rodrigue 1984.
39. Kershaw 1986, discussing his own earlier assessments in Popular Opinion and Political 
Dissent in the Third Reich (1983).
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Finally, even if fascism today is not and will not be the return of old-style 
fascism but more eclectic and variegated versions of extreme-Right politics, 
Rosenberg’s essay loses none of its relevance for us. In particular, the increasing 
support drawn from the working class by parties of the extreme Right in 
countries such as France, Austria, Denmark and Norway,40 or the ability of the 
Sangh Parivar in India (the RSS/BJP combine) to create mass-mobilisations 
based on hate-campaigns and strategies of tension should be some of the 
more pressing reasons why the Left needs to return to the issue of fascism in a 
central way.
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